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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regu-
larized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect
information games (IIG). We generalize existing
results of Poincare´ recurrence from normal-form
games to zero-sum two-player imperfect informa-
tion games and other sequential game settings.
We then investigate how adapting the reward (by
adding a regularization term) of the game can
give strong convergence guarantees in monotone
games. We continue by showing how this reward
adaptation technique can be leveraged to build
algorithms that converge exactly to the Nash equi-
librium. Finally, we show how these insights can
be directly used to build state-of-the-art model-
free algorithms for zero-sum two-player Imper-
fect Information Games (IIG).
1. Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of learning a Nash equilib-
rium in several classes of games. Learning Nash equilibria
in competitive games is complex as agents no longer share
information but behave independently. Various techniques
have been proposed to solve these games, with the current
state-of-the-art usually guaranteeing average-time conver-
gence of the learned policy to a Nash equilibrium, but not
necessarily convergence of the policy itself to Nash. Unfor-
tunately, these convergence guarantees are not conducive
to learning in large games, which rely on general function
approximation techniques (e.g., deep neural networks) that
are inherently difficult to time-average. Moreover, the real-
time behaviors of the policy can be quite distinctive from its
time-average counterpart, and can even diverge away from
Nash equilibria (Bailey & Piliouras, 2018).
In some adversarial games, Follow the Regularized
Leader (FoReL) is known to be convergent if the equilib-
1DeepMind 2SUTD. Correspondence to: Julien Perolat <pero-
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Figure 1. The trajectory plots for FoReL (plot (a)) and for the ver-
sion with a reward transform with a parameter η multipliers 0.5, 1
and 10 (plots (b), (c), (d) respectively) in a biased matching pennies
game (the payoff table for the first player is [[1,−1], [−1, 10]]).
The red dot is the equilibrium policies of the original game.
rium is deterministic, and recurrent if the equilibrium is
mixed with full support (Mertikopoulos et al., 2018). A spe-
cial case of FoReL dynamics is replicator dynamics (Taylor
& Jonker, 1978), the main dynamic of evolutionary game
theory, whose recurrent behavior in zero-sum games and
generalizations is well studied (Piliouras & Shamma, 2014;
Boone & Piliouras, 2019). More generally, value-based
methods have been well-studied in multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning (Littman, 1994; 2001; Hu & Wellman, 2003)
but numerous issues of convergence have been noticed. But
a notable empirical finding shows that regularization of
Q-learning in matrix games can induce the policy to con-
verge in real-time to a Nash equilibrium (Tuyls et al., 2003;
Kaisers & Tuyls, 2010; 2011) or in the replicator dynamics
to Quantal-Response-Equilibrium (Ortega & Legg, 2018;
McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995; Tuyls & Nowe´, 2005). Other
theoretical investigations show that softmax best response
can guarantee convergence in Q-learning (Leslie & Collins,
2005).
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Motivated by these findings, this paper formally analyzes
the impact of regularization on learning dynamics, extend-
ing beyond the simple case of matrix games and focusing
particularly on the application of FoReL to imperfect in-
formation games. The contributions of the paper are as
follows:
• We generalize the Poincare´ recurrence result (Mer-
tikopoulos et al., 2018) to the case of sequential im-
perfect information games. This proves that strategies
can cycle in IIG when using FoReL (e.g., similar to the
normal form game case Fig. 1, (a)).
• We prove that changing the reward structure of the
game improves convergence guarantees at the cost of
slightly modifying the equilibrium of the game (e.g.,
as in Fig. 1, (b), (c), (d)).
• We show that this reward adaptation method can be
used to build a sequence of closer and closer pseudo-
solutions converging onto a Nash equilibrium.
• We illustrate that by using these theoretical findings,
we improve the state-of-the-art of deep reinforcement
learning in imperfect information games.
1.1. Related Work
We discuss related work along three axes: (i) follow the reg-
ularized leader and regret minimization, (ii) gradient based
methods in differentiable games, and (iii) dynamic program-
ming and reinforcement learning approaches in games.
FoReL and regret minimization in Games. There exists
a large corpus of literature providing evidence that minimax
equilibria (or Nash equilibria) in normal form zero-sum
two-player games are often unstable rest points of FoReL
(or at best neutrally stable). In evolutionary game theory, the
replicator dynamics (Zeeman, 1980; 1981; Weibull, 1997;
Gintis, 2009) are known to be unstable in the case of an
interior equilibrium in zero-sum two-player normal form
games (Bloembergen et al., 2015). Many machine learning
approaches can be used in self-play to learn an equilibrium:
regret minimization methods have been extensively studied
in zero-sum games (Cesa-Biachi & Lugosi, 2006; Syrgkanis
et al., 2015; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Zinkevich et al.,
2008; Hofbauer et al., 2009; Cesa-Biachi & Lugosi, 2006),
for which the average policy played over time converges
to an equilibrium, but the actual policy is known to be re-
current (Piliouras & Shamma, 2014; Mertikopoulos et al.,
2018). The convergence of the actual policy can be ob-
tained when the opponent plays a best response (Waugh
& Bagnell, 2015; Abernethy et al., 2018) but not in the
self-play setting. The best response sequences of Fictitious
Play (Brown, 1951) and smoother variants (Hofbauer &
Sandholm, 2002) converge in time-average. Polymatrix
games can be solved by linear programming (Cai et al.,
2016) (we will study a generalization of this class). Regret
minimization techniques can be used to learn a Nash equi-
librium, 1 but also in this setting, the convergence to a Nash
equilibrium requires to compute a time-average policy, and
the policy itself is recurrent (Mertikopoulos et al., 2018).
Gradient Based Methods in Differentiable Games.
Differentiable games (e.g. GANs) trained by gradient de-
scent present many failure modes (Balduzzi et al., 2018).
In (Balduzzi et al., 2018) the authors prove that learning
dynamics of gradient descent can cycle in some classes
of games. This problem can be resolved by introducing
second-order optimization (Balduzzi et al., 2018; Foerster
et al., 2017; Mescheder et al., 2017; Letcher et al., 2019),
negative momentum (Gidel et al., 2019) or game theoretic
algorithms (Oliehoek et al., 2017; Grnarova et al., 2018).
Reinforcement Learning in Games. In sequential imper-
fect information games RL methods have been applied with
mild success. Independent reinforcement learning has many
failure modes under these sequential imperfect informa-
tion settings, as demonstrated in (Lanctot et al., 2017). In
zero-sum sequential imperfect information games, the pol-
icy can cycle around the minimax equilibrium without ever
converging, even in simple single-state games (Piliouras
& Shamma, 2014; Mertikopoulos et al., 2018; Singh et al.,
2000; Bloembergen et al., 2015; Bailey & Piliouras, 2018).
In cooperative settings, players tend to overfit to the oppo-
nent while learning, without being able to generalize to other
opponents’ behaviors (Matignon et al., 2012). Generally
speaking, in the sequential setting, learning in games can
be addressed by either approximate dynamic programming
in the perfect information case (Lagoudakis & Parr, 2002;
Pe´rolat et al., 2015; 2016; Pe´rolat et al., 2016; 2017; Geist
et al., 2019), regret minimization algorithms (Zinkevich
et al., 2008; Lanctot, 2013; Lanctot et al., 2009) (which suf-
fer from the aforementioned time-averaging problem), best
response algorithms (Heinrich et al., 2015; Lanctot et al.,
2017; Heinrich & Silver, 2016), model free reinforcement
learning methods (Srinivasan et al., 2018; Heinrich & Silver,
2016) or policy gradient in the worst case (Lockhart et al.,
2019). However, the previous model free RL methods are
not flawless: Neural Fictitious Self Play (NFSP) (Heinrich
& Silver, 2016) maintains two data sets of respectively 600
and 2000 times the size of the game, the methods presented
in (Srinivasan et al., 2018) empirically show a convergence
in time-average without formal proof, and (Lockhart et al.,
2019) require the exact computation of a best response.
1Since for a coarse correlated equilibrium, the marginals with
respect to the players are a Nash equilibrium (Cai et al., 2016)
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2. Warming up: Normal Form Games
We first sketch our main results in repeated zero-sum two-
player normal form games.
Background. In a zero-sum two-player normal form
game, two players select their actions ai ∈ A (a =
(a1, a2) = (ai, a−i)) according to a policy pii ∈ ∆A
(pi = (pi1, pi2) = (pii, pi−i), where −i encodes the op-
ponent of player i), and as a result will receive a reward
ripi(a
1, a2). The reward is policy-independent (ri(a1, a2))
if it is only a function of the actions of the players and not
of their policies; policy-independent reward is a standard
assumption in the literature. If policy pi is played we de-
fine the Q-function to be the expected reward for player
i for action ai (i.e. Qipi(a
i) = Ea−i∼pi−i [ripi(ai, a−i)])
and the value function to be the expected reward (i.e.
V ipi = Ea∼pi[ripi(a)] = Eai∼pii [Qipi(ai)]).
By definition, a policy pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all
pi and for all i we have V ipii,pi∗−i − V ipi∗ ≤ 0. In other words,
a Nash equilibrium is a joint policy such that no player has
an incentive to change its policy if all the other players stick
to their policy.
Follow the Regularized Leader (FoReL). FoReL is an
exploration-exploitation algorithm that maximizes the cu-
mulative payoff of the player (exploitation) minus a regular-
ization term (exploration). The continuous time version of
this algorithm is defined as follows:
yit(a
i) =
t∫
0
Qipis(a
i)ds and piit = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, yit)
where Λi(p, y) = 〈y, p〉 − φi(p) and φi is the regularizer, a
function which is assumed to be: (1) continuous and strictly
convex on ∆A and (2) smooth on the relative interior of
every face of ∆A (including ∆A itself). Standard choices
of φi include: (1) entropy φi(p) =
∑
a p(a) log p(a), and
(2) `2-norm φi(p) =
∑
a |p(a)|2. The choice of the regu-
larizer lead to different dynamics: entropy regularization
yields the replicator dynamics and l2-norm regularization
yields the projection dynamics (Mertikopoulos et al., 2018).
We will write φ∗i (y) = maxp Λ
i(p, y) and we have the prop-
erty that arg maxp∈∆A Λ
i(p, y) = ∇yφ∗i (y) (maximizing
argument Shalev-Shwartz et al. (2012, p.147)).
If pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium, a useful measure of interest that
measures the distance to a Nash equilibrium is
J(y) =
2∑
i=1
[
φ∗i (yi)− 〈yi, pi∗i 〉
]
.
This quantity (and its generalization introduced in sec-
tion. 3) will be used to construct strong Lyapunov functions
in many games of interest. As a warm up, this section will
explore these convergence results in the normal form case.
Recurrence. If the reward is policy-independent and if
there exists an interior equilibrium, it is known that the pol-
icy under FoReL will be recurrent (Mertikopoulos et al.,
2018). We will generalize this result to sequential Imperfect
Information Games in section 4. Crucially, this strong neg-
ative result indicates that convergence cannot be achieved
with FoReL in games with a mixed strategy equilibrium, so
long as the reward is policy-independent. Thus, in the rest
of the paper, we will explore how to transform the reward by
adding a policy-dependent term to guarantee convergence
(see section 5,6).
Reward transformation and convergence in normal-
form games. Section 5 explores the idea of reward trans-
formation by adding a policy dependent term. If the reward
is not policy-independent, one can show that:
d
dt
J(y) =
2∑
i=1
[V ipiit,pi∗−i
− V ipi∗ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0 because pi∗ is a Nash
+
2∑
i=1
Ea∼(pi∗i,pi−it )[r
i
pi∗i,pi−it
(a)− ripit(a)]
We later generalize this result in lemma 3.1. As an example,
consider the following policy dependent reward, which also
preserves the zero-sum property for any policy µ with a full
support:
ripi(a) = r
i(ai, a−i)− η log pi
i(ai)
µi(ai)
+ η log
pi−i(a−i)
µ−i(a−i)
Given the above reward, we can show that:
d
dt
J(y) =
2∑
i=1
[V ipiit,pi∗−i
− V ipi∗ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0 because pi∗ is a Nash
−η
2∑
i=1
KL(pi∗i, piit)
This inequality ensures that pit will converge to pi∗, the Nash
of the game defined by ripi(a), using Lyapunov arguments.
Note that pi∗ will depend on µ and η. Transforming the
reward improves the convergence property of the game but
will shift the equilibrium, a phenomena illustrated in figure 1
where φi is the entropy for all players. Thus, this technique
does not directly guarantee convergence to the Nash of the
original game. We next introduce a technique to adapt the
policy-dependent term in the reward, thereby guaranteeing
convergence to the actual Nash equilibrium of the game.
Direct Convergence. Solving the original game can be
achieved by iteratively solving the game with the reward
rik,pi(h, a) = r
i(ai, a−i)−η log pii(ai)
piik−1(a
i)
+η log pi
−i(a−i)
pi−ik−1(a
−i)
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and use the Nash of that game pik to modify the reward of the
next game (starting with pi0 as the uniform policy). The se-
quence of policies (pik)k≥0 converges to pi∗, the equilibrium
of the policy-independent reward ri(ai, a−i). Specifically,
we can show that:
2∑
i=1
[
KL(pi∗i, piik)−KL(pi∗i, piik−1)
]
≤ −
2∑
i=1
KL(piik, pi
i
k−1)
which is enough to prove that (pik)k≥0 converges to pi∗,
using Lyapunov-style arguments (this result is proved in
section 6). This set of results establishes a foundation for
convergent learning in the normal-form case. We next lay
out the principles necessary for generalizing to the IIG set-
ting, with our main result detailed in section 6.
3. Background in Sequential Imperfect
Information Games
In a sequential imperfect information game, N players and
a chance player (written c) interact sequentially starting
from a history hinit. The set of all possible histories is
written H = ∪i∈{1,...,N,c}Hi. The sets Hi are the set of
histories at player’s i turn (all Hi are disjoint). The set of
terminal historiesZi is a subset ofHi in which the game has
ended (Z = ∪i∈{1,...,N,c}Zi). In each history h ∈ H , the
current player will observe an information state x ∈ X =
∪i∈{1,...,N,c}Xi. The function τ(h) 7→ i ∈ {1, . . . , N, c}
provides the player’s turn at a given history. We will also
write x(h) ∈ X for the information state corresponding to
an history h. We will write h ∈ x if x(h) = x.
At each history h ∈ H\Z , the current player will play an
action a ∈ A. As a result, each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
will receive a reward ri(h, a) and the state will transition to
h′ = ha. We will write h @ h′ if there exists a sequence of
k actions (ai)0≤i≤k such that ha0 · · · ak = h′. The history
h is then said to be a prefix of h′.
A policy pi(a|x) maps an information state x to a distribution
over actions ∆A. The restriction of pi over Xi is written pii
and pi−i is the restriction of pi overX\Xi. We will write pi =
(pii, pi−i). As in section. 2, we consider a policy dependent
reward (written ripi(h, a)), which can be dependent on the
full policy. The rest of this section introduces reinforcement
learning tools used to define FoReL in IIG and used in the
proofs.
Value function on the histories. The value of a policy
for player i at history h is defined as follow:
V ipi(h) = E
[∑
n≥0
ripi(hn, an)|h0 = h, hn+1 = hn an,
an ∼ pi(.|x(hn))
]
=
∑
a
pi(a|x(h)) [ripi(h, a) + V ipi(ha)]
The value of a policy for player i at history h while taking
action a is defined as follow:
Qipi(h, a) = E
[∑
n≥0
ripi(hn, an)|h0 = h, a0 = a,
hn+1 = hn an, an ∼ pi(.|x(hn))
]
= ripi(h, a) + V
i
pi(ha)
Reach probabilities. The reach probability of a history h
is (note that this product may include the chance player):
ρpi(h) =
∏
h′a@h
pi(a|x(h′))
The reach probability of player i of a history h is:
ρpi
i
(h) =
∏
h′a@h, τ(h′)=i
pi(a|x(h′))
The reach probability of player −i of a history h is (this
product may include the chance player too):
ρpi
−i
(h) =
∏
h′a@h, τ(h′)6=i
pi(a|x(h′))
In the end, ∀h ∈ H:ρpi(h) = ρpii(h)ρpi−i(h)
The reach probability of an information state x ∈ X is
defined as follows:
ρpi(x) =
∑
h∈x
ρpi(h) and ρpi
−i
(x) =
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
(h)
Under perfect recall (M. Zinkevich, 2007), we can write for
any h ∈ x:
ρpi(x) = ρpi
i
(h)ρpi
−i
(x)
And under perfect recall we will write for all h ∈
x, ρpi
i
(x) = ρpi
i
(h) Furthermore, V ipi(hinit) =∑
h∈H
ρpi(h)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|x(h))ripi(h, a)
Value Function on the information states. The only in-
formation available to a player is the information state. We
define the expected value of the game given such an infor-
mation state x as follows:
V ipi(x) =
∑
h∈x
ρpi(h)V ipi(h)∑
h∈x
ρpi(h)
=︸︷︷︸
perfect recall
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
(h)V ipi(h)∑
h∈x
ρpi−i(h)
And the expected Q-function given x and a is:
Qipi(x, a) =
∑
h∈x
ρpi(h)Qipi(h, a)∑
h∈x
ρpi(h)
=
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
(h)Qipi(h, a)∑
h∈x
ρpi−i(h)
Now we can define a Nash equilibrium in the sequential
imperfect information game setting. Formally:
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Definition 3.1. A strategy pi is a Nash equilibrium if for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for all pi′i: V ipi′i,pi−i(hinit) ≤
V ipii,pi−i(hinit)
3.1. Monotone Games
In this paper, we are interested in: (i) zero-sum two-player
games, i.e., V 1pi = −V 2pi (many games implemented in
OpenSpiel (Lanctot et al., 2019) fall in that category); (ii)
in zero-sum N -player polymatrix games, i.e., when the
value can be decomposed in a sum of pairwise interactions
V ipi =
∑
j 6=i
V˜ ipii,pij with V˜
i
pii,pij = −V˜ jpij ,pii generalizing Cai
et al. (2016); Mertikopoulos et al. (2018); and finally (iii) in
games where the profit of one player is decoupled from the
interaction with the opponents, i.e., when the value can be
decomposed in V ipi = V¯
i
pii + V¯
i
pi−i . All these settings can be
captured by the following monotonicity condition:
Definition 3.2. Let us define Ωi(pi, µ) = V ipii,pi−i(hinit) −
V iµi,pi−i(hinit) − V ipii,µ−i(hinit) + V iµi,µ−i(hinit). A game is
monotone if for all policies pi, µ, pi 6= µ:∑
i∈{1,...,N}
Ωi(pi, µ) ≤ 0
This condition is slightly difficult to interpret but as men-
tioned above, it captures a wide class of games (zero-sum
two-player, polymatrix zero-sum games etc.). See proof in
appendix I.
3.2. Follow the Regularized Leader
Follow the Regularized Leader in imperfect information
games defines a sequence of policies (pis)s≥0 for all i ∈
{1, . . . , N} and x ∈ Xi as follow:
yit(x, a) =
t∫
0
ρpi
−i
s (x)Qipis(x, a)ds
piit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, yit(x, .))
We define the following quantity for any Nash equilibrium
pi∗ of the game:
J(y) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[φ∗i (y
i(x, .))− 〈pi∗(.|x), yi(x, .)〉]
This quantity will be at the center of our analysis of Follow
the Regularized Leader in sections 4 and 5. The following
lemma shows how this quantity evolves if both players learn
using Follow the Regularized Leader updates. We will
use this quantity to create a Lyapunov function for policy-
dependent reward and use it to bound the trajectories of
FoReL to prove Poincare´ recurrence; intuitively, that “most”
trajectories do not converge to equilibria.
Lemma 3.1. If yt is defined as the follow the regularized
leader dynamics we have:
d
dt
J(y) =
N∑
i=1
[V ipiit,pi∗−i
− V ipi∗ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
N∑
i=1
Ωi(pi, pi∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 0 for a monotone game
+
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)×
Ea∼(pi∗i,pi−it )(..|x(h))[r
i
pi∗i,pi−it
(h, a)− ripit(h, a)]
(proof in appendix A)
4. Recurrence of FoReL
This section generalizes the results of (Mertikopoulos et al.,
2018) to Follow the Regularized Leader in monotone Im-
perfect Information Games when the reward is policy-
independent (all the zero-sum two-player games imple-
mented in OpenSpiel (Lanctot et al., 2019) have this prop-
erty) and when the equilibrium has a full support. This
requires two steps, first we will prove that an equivalent
learning dynamic is Divergence-free (or preserves volume).
Then we will use lemma 3.1 to show that all trajectories of
this new dynamical system are bounded. This is enough to
prove that the trajectories of FoReL are Poincare´ recurrent.
Intuitively this means that all trajectories will go back to a
neighborhood of their starting point arbitrarily often. The
Poincare´ recurrence theorem (Piliouras & Shamma, 2014;
Mertikopoulos et al., 2018; Poincare´, 1890) states:
Theorem 4.1. If a flow preserves volume (is Divergence-
free) and has only bounded orbits then for each open set
there exist orbits that intersect the set infinitely often.
Instead of studying the original dynamical system, we will
fix an action ax for all x and consider the dynamical system
(as this system keeps w bounded):
w˙it(x, a) = ρ
pi−it (x)[Qipit(x, a)−Qipit(x, ax)] (1)
piit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, wit(x, .)) (2)
Divergence-free. In order to get qualitative results on
FoReL, we will prove that the FoReL dynamic is
Divergence-free (a generalization of a result from Mer-
tikopoulos et al. (2018)).
Lemma 4.1. The system defined above (equation (1)
and (2)) is autonomous (can be written as w˙t = ξ(wt)),
Divergence-free, and the dynamic of the policy pit is equiv-
alent to the one defined in section 3.2 when the reward is
policy-independent. (Proof in appendix B)
This property is critical as it implies that the dynamical
system has no attractor (Weibull, 1997, p.252, prop 6.6).
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Remark. This does not mean that the policy will not con-
verge. If the w diverges, the policy might converge to a
deterministic strategy. However, if the Nash is of full sup-
port, it will not be an attractor of the dynamical system.
We now know that Nash equilibria cannot be attractors of
FoReL as the system is Divergence-free. In order to prove
the Poincare´ recurrence, we need to prove an additional
property. We need the trajectory wt to remain bounded if
the equilibrium pi∗ is interior.
Lemma 4.2. If the equilibrium is interior, then
N∑
i=1
[V i
piit,pi
∗−i − V ipi∗ ] = 0.
(Proof in appendix E)
Corollary 4.1. In a monotone game with a policy-
independent reward and an interior equilibrium, if yt is de-
fined as following the FoReL algorithm we have: ddtJ(y) ≤
0
Corolary 4.1 implies that the trajectories of the dynamics
equation (1) and (2) are bounded. This can be proven by
directly using arguments from (Mertikopoulos et al., 2018,
Lemma D.2.).
Poincare´ recurrence. As we have seen in the two pre-
vious paragraphs, the flow of FoReL is Divergence-free
and all trajectories are bounded in the case of monotone
games with an interior Nash equilibrium. Thus all orbits are
Poincare´ recurrent.
5. Reward Transformation and Convergence
in IIG
In section 4 we have seen that a policy-independent reward
signal can lead to recurrent behavior. The idea we study here
is to slightly modify the reward signal such that the Nash
equilibrium of this new game is an attractor. We will show
two reward transformations that guarantee convergence to
a Nash equilibrium (with Lyapunov arguments). The first
reward transformation applies generally to monotone games
and the second one applies specifically to zero-sum games.
But first we briefly recall the Lyapunov method.
Lyapunov method. The idea of the Lyapunov method
to study the ordinary differential equation ddtyt = ξ(yt)
is to look at the variations of a quantity F(y) ≥ 0 (and
F(y∗) = 0). The function F is said to be a strict Lyapunov
function if:
∀y 6= y∗, d
dt
F(yt) < 0
In that case, the yt will converge to a minimum of F if ξ is
locally Lipschitz and if F is a continuously differentiable
function. The function F is said to be a strong Lyapunov
function if:
d
dt
F(yt) ≤ −βF(yt), β > 0
In this case, the yt will converge to a minimum of F at an
exponentially fast rate F(yt) ≤ F(y0) exp(−βt).
Monotone games. In the general case of monotone
games, the reward that for any µ preserves the monotonicity
is: (see proof in section F)
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i(h)
log
pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
An immediate corollary of lemma 3.1 is:
Corollary 5.1. In monotone games, the reward transforma-
tion ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) considered
above implies that H will be decreasing:
d
dtJ(y) ≤ −η
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL(pi∗(.|x(h)), pit(.|x(h)))
Finally, if the regularizer φi is the en-
tropy, we can show that the Ξ(pi∗, pit) =
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL(pi∗(.|x(h)), pit(.|x(h))) is a strong
Lyapunov function:
Theorem 5.1. If the regularizer φi is the entropy:
d
dt
Ξ(pi∗, pit) ≤ −ηΞ(pi∗, pit)
it implies: Ξ(pi∗, pit) ≤ Ξ(pi∗, pi0) exp(−ηt) (proof in ap-
pendix C)
This method thus introduces a trade-off between the speed
of convergence of the algorithm and the transformation we
make to the reward (which has an impact on the equilibrium
of the transformed game).
Zero-sum two-player games. Whilst the above approach
can be applied to all monotone games, the following reward
can be applied specifically to zero-sum games. For any µ,
this reward keeps the zero-sum property (see appendix F)
and is more prone to sample based methods as the 1
ρpi−i (h)
is not involved,
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− 1i=τ(h)η log pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
+ 1i 6=τ(h)η log
pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
And in that case:
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Corollary 5.2. We have:
d
dt
J(y) ≤
− η
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)ρpit
−i
(h)KL(pi∗(.|x(h)), pit(.|x(h)))
And here, if the regularizer φi is the en-
tropy, we can show that the Ξ(pi∗, pit) =
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL(pi∗(.|x(h)), pit(.|x(h))) is a strict
Lyapunov function:
Theorem 5.2. If the regularizer φi is the entropy:
d
dt
Ξ(pi∗, pit) ≤ −ηζΞ(pi∗, pit)
with ζ = min
x∈X
min
pi=arg maxp Λ(p,y) and J(y)≤J(y0)
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
(h)
This imply that: Ξ(pi∗, pit) ≤ Ξ(pi∗, pi0) exp(−ζηt)
Proof. The proof follows by combining corollary 5.2 and
the result in appendix C.
In summary, we saw in this section that exponential conver-
gence rates can be achieved in continuous time in imperfect
information games using reward transformation.
Remark. Corrolary 5.1 and 5.2 are valid for all Nash of the
transformed game. This means that for all η, the Nash eq. of
the transformed game is unique. This uniqueness property
is necessary to define the process of the next section.
6. Convergence to an Exact Equilibrium
The previous section introduced a reward transformation
(by adding a policy dependent term ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)−
η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) ) to ensure exponential convergence in
games. However this method does not ensure convergence
to the equilibrium of the game defined on ri(h, a). In this
section, we study the sequence of policies starting from
pi0, being the uniform policy, and pik the solution of the
game with the reward transformation ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)−
η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))pik−1(a|x(h)) . Intuitively, this approach entails
that the policy pik will be searched close to the previous
iterate pik−1 (we write pik = F (pik−1)).
Lemma 6.1. Then for any Nash equilibrium of the game
pi∗, we have the following identity for the sequence of policy
pik:
Ξ(pi∗, pik)−Ξ(pi∗, pik−1) = −Ξ(pik, pik−1)+ 1
η
N∑
i=1
(mik+δ
i
k+κ
i
k)
Where:
Ξ(µ, pi) =
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρµ
i
(h)KL(µ(.|x(h)), pi(.|x(h)))
Where:
κik =
∑
x∈X i
ρpi
∗i
(x)ρpi
−i
k (x)×
∑
a∈A
[
pi∗i(a|x(h))− pik(a|x(h))
]
kQipik(x, a) ≤ 0
Where: δik = V
i
piik,pi
∗−i(hinit)− V ipi∗(hinit) ≤ 0
And where:
mik = V
i
pik
(hinit)− V ipi∗i,pi−ik (hinit)− V
i
piik,pi
∗−i(hinit)
+ V ipi∗(hinit)
And where
N∑
i=1
mik ≤ 0 if the game is monotone (proof in
appendix D).
Theorem 6.1. In a monotone game with all Nash equilib-
rium being interior, the sequence of policy {pik}k≥0 (or
{F k(pi0)}k≥0) converges to a Nash equilibrium of the game
(proof in appendix H).
Remark. We were only able to prove this result for interior
Nash but we conjecture that it is still true for non interior
Nash equilibrium.
7. Empirical evaluation
It has already been empirically noted that regularization
helps convergence in games (Omidshafiei et al., 2019). Ear-
lier work (Srinivasan et al., 2018) also provides experiments
where the current policy converges in Leduc Poker, whilst
the paper only proves convergence analysis of the average
policy. Our work sheds a new light on those results as
the convergence may have been the result of high regular-
ization (the entropy cost added in (Srinivasan et al., 2018)
appendix G was 0.1). The experiments will show how re-
ward transform can be used to improve the state of the art
of reinforcement Learning in Imperfect Information Games.
To keep our implementation as close as possible to FoReL,
we use the NeuRD policy update (Omidshafiei et al., 2019),
a retrace update to estimate the Q-function. In order to keep
our estimate of the return unbiased, we use that learned
Q-function as a control variate as in (Schmid et al., 2019).
The details of the algorithm are in appendix J. We present
results on four games: Kuhn & Leduc Poker, Goofspiel
and Liars Dice, which have respectively 12, 936, 162 and
24,576 information states. We evaluate all our policies us-
ing the NashConv metric (Lanctot et al., 2017) defined as
NashConv(pi) =
∑N
i=1 maxpi′i V
i
pi′i,pi−i(hinit)−V ipi(hinit).
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Figure 2. The left plots illustrate the monotone reward transform
whilst the right plot illustrate the direct convergence method shown
in section 6 where we change the reward every 40000 steps (rf is
the value of the parameter η and lr is the time discretization).
In this section, we highlight two results with function ap-
proximation and illustrate the theory with tabular experi-
ments on Kuhn Poker (figure 2). A more complete empirical
evaluation and the precise description of the setting is avail-
able in appendix K.
7.1. Experiment with a Decaying Regularization
We found that decaying the regularization η exponentially
from an initial value ηmax = 1 to a target value (we looked
at values {1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.01, 0.0}) is an effective em-
pirical method. In figure 3 (top plot), we represent the
NashConv as a function of the number of steps. We achieve
our best performance for η = 0.05 with a NashConv of 0.10.
This outperforms the results of NFSP (Heinrich & Silver,
2016), which has a best result of 0.12 in NashConv (0.06 of
exploitability reported in the paper) and the state of the art
algorithms implemented in Openspiel, which are no better
than 0.2 in NashConv. However, for low choices of η the
algorithm might diverge.
7.2. Iteration over the Regularization
As we have seen in section 6, the convergence to an
exact equilibrium can be achieved by iteratively adapt-
ing the the reward. In the experiment (Fig. 3 bottom
plot), we change the reward periodically every N -steps
Figure 3. The precise setup used is described in appendix J. The
top plot shows results on Leduc poker improving over the NFSP
results using a decay of the regularization η. The bottom plot uses
a fixed regularization and adapts the reward every 7.5e4 steps as
described in section 7.2.
between steps [kN, kN + N2 ] we linearly interpolate be-
tween ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a) − η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))pikN (a|x(h)) and
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a) − η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))pi(k−1)N (a|x(h)) and in
interval [kN+ N2 , (k+1)N ] we use the transformed reward
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a) − η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))pikN (a|x(h)) . As shown
in Fig. 3 (bottom plot), this technique allows convergence
for very high η. This is quite an advantage as the method
will be more robust to the choice of that hyper-parameter.
8. Conclusion
We generalize the Poincare´ recurrence result for FoReL
from 2-player normal-form zero-sum games to sequential
imperfect information games with a monotonicity condition.
Although this is a generalization of a negative convergence
result, we show that several reward transformations can
guarantee convergence to a slightly modified equilibrium.
We also show how to recover the original equilibrium of
the game (when it is interior). Finally, based on these tech-
niques we improve the state-of-the-art in model-free deep
reinforcement learning in imperfect information games.
Since this work only focuses on FoReL, we aim to analyze
the behavior of other dynamics in the sequential case from
a dynamical systems perspective in future work. Fictitious
play or softmax Q-learning have been theoretically consid-
ered in normal form games and their analysis with Lyapunov
methods remains to be done in the IIG case. Furthermore,
the role of regularization for convergence in games needs
to be studied more systematically in other settings. Ideas
like regularization could also be studied in for example
Generative Adversarial Networks.
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A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
d
dt
J(y) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)ρpi
−i
t (x)〈pit(.|x)− pi∗(.|x), Qipit(x, .)〉
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
t (h)〈pit(.|x(h))− pi∗(.|x(h)), Qipit(h, .)〉
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)〈pit(.|x(h))− pi∗(.|x(h)), Qipit(h, .)〉
=
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)〈pit(.|x(h))− pi∗(.|x(h)), Qipit(h, .)〉
Let’s write ip¯it = (pi∗i, pi−it ) and let’s notice that for all h ∈ H−i, we have that ip¯it(.|x(h)) = pit(.|x(h)) and thus for all
h ∈ H−i, 〈pit(.|x(h))− ip¯it(.|x(h)), Qipit(h, .)〉 = 0
d
dt
J(y) =
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)〈pit(.|x(h))− ip¯it(.|x(h)), Qipit(h, .)〉
=
N∑
i=1
[ ∑
h∈H\Z
ρ
ip¯it(h)
[
V ipit(h)−
∑
a∈A
ip¯it(a|x(h))(ripit(h, a) + V ipit(ha))
]
+
∑
h∈Z
ρ
ip¯it(h)V ipit(h)
]
=
[
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯it(h)V ipit(h)
]
−
[
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\{hinit}
ρ
ip¯it(h)V ipit(h)
]
−
[
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρ
ip¯it(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯it(a|x(h))ripit(h, a)
]
=
N∑
i=1
V ipit(hinit)−
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρ
ip¯it(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯it(a|x(h))riip¯it(h, a)
+
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρ
ip¯it(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯it(a|x(h))[riip¯it(h, a)− ripit(h, a)]
=
[
N∑
i=1
V ipit(hinit)− V i(pi∗i,pi−it )(hinit)
]
+
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)Ea∼(pi∗i,pi−it )(..|x(h))[r
i
pi∗i,pi−it
(h, a)− ripit(h, a)]
=
[
N∑
i=1
V i(piit,pi∗−i)
(hinit)− V ipi∗(hinit)
]
+
[
N∑
i=1
V ipit(hinit)− V i(pi∗i,pi−it )(hinit)− V
i
(piit,pi
∗−i)(hinit) + V
i
pi∗(hinit)
]
+
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)Ea∼(pi∗i,pi−it )(..|x(h))[r
i
pi∗i,pi−it
(h, a)− ripit(h, a)]
Which concludes the proof.
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B. The system is equivalent to FoReL dynamics and is Divergence-free (lemma 4.1)
The dynamical system
w˙it(x, a) = ρ
pi−it (x)[Qipit(x, a)−Qipit(x, ax)]
piit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, wit(x, .))
And
y˙it(x, a) = ρ
p˜i−it (x)Qip˜it(x, a)
p˜iit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, yit(x, .))
generate the same sequence of policies
Proof. For all x ∈ Xi the variable:
yit(x, a) =
t∫
s=0
ρp˜i
−i
s (x)Qip˜is(x, a)ds
and we define y˜it(x, a) as:
y˜it(x, a)
= yit(x, a)− yit(x, ax)
=
t∫
s=0
ρp˜i
−i
s (x)Qip˜is(x, a)ds−
t∫
s=0
ρp˜i
−i
s (x)Qip˜is(x, ax)ds
=
t∫
s=0
ρp˜i
−i
s (x)
[
Qip˜is(x, a)−Qip˜is(x, ax)
]
ds
p˜iit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, yit(x, .)) = arg max
p∈∆A
= Λi(p, yit(x, .)− yit(x, ax)) = Λi(p, y˜it(x, a))
Thus y˜it(x, a) and y
i
t(x, a) generate the same sequence of policy.
And since y˜it(x, a) and w
i
t(x, a) follow the same differential equation and have the same initial conditions, w
i
t(x, a) and
yit(x, a) generate the same sequence of policies.
The dynamical system:
w˙it(x, a) = ρ
pi−it (x)[Qipit(x, a)−Qipit(x, ax)]
piit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, wit(x, .))
is an autonomous dynamical system as piit is a function of w
i
t(x, a). Let us write it wt = ξ(wt) we have ξ(wt)(i, x, a) =
ρpi
−i
t (x)[Qipit(x, a)−Qipit(x, ax)].
Finally, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},∀x ∈ Xi,∀a ∈ A, ξ(w)(i, x, a) = ρpi−i(x)[Qipi(x, a) − Qipi(x, ax)] (where pii(.|x) =
arg maxp∈∆A Λ
i(p, wi(x, .))) is independent of wi(x, a) as ρpi
−i
(x)Qipi(x, a) =
∑
h∈x
[ri(h, a) + V ipi(ha)] does not depend
on pii(.|x).
Thus we have ∂ξ(w)(i,x,a)∂wi(x,a) = 0. This proves that the divwξ(w) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
∑
a∈A
∂ξ(w)(i,x,a)
∂wi(x,a) = 0 and that the dynamics is
incompressible.
Finding Equilibrium via Regularization
C. Proof Strong Lyapunov Function
J(y) +
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)φi(pi
∗(.|x)) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[φ∗i (y
i(x, .))− 〈pi∗(.|x), yi(x, .)〉+ φi(pi∗(.|x))]
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[Λi(pii(.|x), yi(x, .))− 〈pi∗(.|x), yi(x, .)〉+ φi(pi∗(.|x))]
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[〈pii(.|x), yi(x, .)〉 − φi(pii(.|x))− 〈pi∗(.|x), yi(x, .)〉+ φi(pi∗(.|x))]
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[φi(pi
∗(.|x))− φi(pii(.|x)) + 〈pii(.|x)− pi∗(.|x), yi(x, .)〉]
for all yi in {yi | ∑
ai∈Ai
yi(ai) = 0}, the tangent space of ∆Ai, we have that ∇hi(∇h∗i (yi)) = yi if ∇h∗i (yi) is in the
interior of ∆Ai (see (Hofbauer & Sandholm, 2002) for the statement of this property). Thus, for all yi there exists a δ such
that ∇hi(∇h∗i (yi)) = yi + δ1
In the end:
J(y) +
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)φi(pi
∗(.|x)) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[φi(pi
∗(.|x))− φi(pii(.|x)) + 〈pii(.|x)− pi∗(.|x), yi(x, .)〉]
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[φi(pi
∗(.|x))− φi(pii(.|x)) + 〈pii(.|x)− pi∗(.|x),∇φi(∇φ∗i (yi(x, .)))〉]
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)[φi(pi
∗(.|x))− φi(pii(.|x)) + 〈pii(.|x)− pi∗(.|x),∇φi(pii(.|x))〉]
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)Dφi(pi
∗(.|x), pii(.|x))
Where Dφi is the Bregman divergence associated with φi. If φi is the entropy, we the following equality J(y) +
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)φi(pi
∗(.|x)) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗i
(x)KL(pi∗(.|x), pii(.|x)) = Ξ(pi∗, pi).
That is why:
d
dt
J(y) =
d
dt
Ξ(pi∗, pi)
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D. Proof of Lemma 6.1
Let us write kripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))pik−1(a|x(h)) and
ip¯ik = (pi
∗i, pi−ik )∑
h∈H
ρpik(h)
∑
a∈A
pik(a|x(h))kripik(h, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
=
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h)) kripik(h, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
+
∑
h∈H
ρpik(h)
∑
a∈A
pik(a|x(h))kripik(h, a)−
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h)) kripik(h, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
Let us write the value function for the reward kripi(h, a) and policy pik will be written
kV ipik(h) =∑
a pik(a|x(h))
[
kripik(h, a) +
kV ipik(ha)
]
(1) = kV ipik(hinit)−
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h)) kripik(h, a)
=
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h) kV ipik(h)−
∑
h∈H\{hinit}
ρ
ip¯ik(h) kV ipik(h)−
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h)) kripik(h, a)
=
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
[
kV ipik(h)−
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h)) kV ipik(ha)
]
−
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h)) kripik(h, a)
=
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
[
kV ipik(h)−
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h))
[
kripik(h, a) +
kV ipik(ha)
]]
=
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
[
pik(a|x(h))− ip¯ik(a|x(h))
]
k
=
∑
x∈X i
∑
h∈x
ρpi
∗i
(h)ρpi
−i
k (h)
∑
a∈A
[
pik(a|x(h))− pi∗i(a|x(h))
]
kQipik(h, a)
=
∑
x∈X i
ρpi
∗i
(x)
∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
k (h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρpi
−i
k (x)
∑
a∈A
[
pik(a|x(h))− pi∗i(a|x(h))
]
kQipik(h, a) from perfect recall
=
∑
x∈X i
ρpi
∗i
(x)
[∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
k (h)
]∑
a∈A
[
pik(a|x(h))− pi∗i(a|x(h))
] ∑h∈x ρpi−ik (h) kQipik(h, a)∑
h∈x
ρpi
−i
k (h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
kQipik
(x,a)
=
∑
x∈X i
ρpi
∗i
(x)ρpi
−i
k (x)
∑
a∈A
[
pik(a|x(h))− pi∗i(a|x(h))
]
kQipik(x, a)
= − κik︸︷︷︸
≤0
≥ 0 as pik is a Nash for the game defined on reward kripi(h, a)
Then:
(2) =
∑
h∈H
ρpik(h)
∑
a∈A
pik(a|x(h))ri(h, a)− η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
k(h)
∑
a∈A
piik(a|x(h)) log
piik(a|x(h))
piik−1(a|x(h))
= V ipik(hinit)− η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
k(h)KL
(
piik(.|x(h)), piik−1(.|x(h))
)
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And Finally:
(3) =
∑
h∈H
ρ
ip¯ik(h)
∑
a∈A
ip¯ik(a|x(h))ri(h, a)− η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)
∑
a∈A
pi∗i(a|x(h)) log pik(a|x(h))
pik−1(a|x(h))
= V i
pi∗i,pi−ik
(hinit)− η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)
[
KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik−1(.|x(h))
)−KL (pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik(.|x(h)))]
Now combining (2) = (3) + (1) we have:
η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik(.|x(h))
)− η ∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik−1(.|x(h))
)
= V ipik(hinit)− V ipi∗i,pi−ik (hinit) + κ
i
k − η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
k(h)KL
(
piik(.|x(h)), piik−1(.|x(h))
)
= V ipik(hinit)− V ipi∗i,pi−ik (hinit)− V
i
piik,pi
∗−i(hinit) + V
i
pi∗(hinit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=mik
+V ipiik,pi∗−i
(hinit)− V ipi∗(hinit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δik
+κik
− η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
k(h)KL
(
piik(.|x(h)), piik−1(.|x(h))
)
And finally we have the desired property:∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik(.|x(h))
)− ∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik−1(.|x(h))
)
=
1
η
mik +
1
η
δik +
1
η
κik −
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
k(h)KL
(
piik(.|x(h)), piik−1(.|x(h))
)
And we get the result by summing over the players:
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik(.|x(h))
)− N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL
(
pi∗i(.|x(h)), pik−1(.|x(h))
)
=
1
η
N∑
i=1
mik +
1
η
N∑
i=1
δik +
1
η
N∑
i=1
κik −
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
k(h)KL
(
piik(.|x(h)), piik−1(.|x(h))
)
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E. Proof of Lemma 4.2
If the equilibrium is interior, then
N∑
i=1
[V i
piit,pi
∗−i − V ipi∗ ] = 0.
Proof. First let us show that ∀i, pii:
V ipii,pi∗−i − V ipi∗ (3)
=
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
i
(x)ρpi
∗−i
(x)
∑
a∈A
(
pi∗i(a|x)− pii(a|x)
)
Qipi∗(x, a) (4)
Since pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium we always have V ipii,pi∗−i − V ipi∗ ≤ 0. Let us suppose that there exists an information
state x such that Qipi∗(x, a) does not have the same values for all actions and that the equilibrium is of full support.
Then a greedy policy on that state x (and pi∗ on the other states) should improve the value for player i. This would
contradict pi∗ being a Nash equilibrium. This proves that all Q-values Qipi∗(x, a) are equals for every states x. Then∑
a∈A
(
pi∗i(a|x)− pii(a|x))Qipi∗(x, a) = 0 for all states.
This concludes the proof that for all t,
N∑
i=1
[V i
piit,pi
∗−i − V ipi∗ ] = 0.
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F. Reward Transformation in Monotone Games
The reward transformation that can be considered are the following:
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− 1i=τ(h)η log pi(a|x(h))
ρpi−i(h)
or,
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− 1i=τ(h)η log pi(a|x(h))
ρpi−i(x(h))
or for any µ,
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i(h)
log
pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
or finally for any µ,
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i(x(h))
log
pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
And in that case we have:
d
dtJ(y) =
N∑
i=1
[V i
piit,pi
∗−i − V ipi∗ ] +
N∑
i=1
Ωi(pi, pi∗)− η
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)KL(pi∗(.|x(h)), pit(.|x(h)))
Proof. For the game defined on reward ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h))
V ipi(hinit) =
∑
h∈H
ρpi(h)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|x(h))ripi(h, a)
=
∑
h∈H
ρpi(h)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|x(h))
[
ri(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i(h)
log
pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
]
=
∑
h∈H
ρpi(h)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|x(h))ri(h, a)− η
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
(h)
∑
a∈A
pii(a|x(h)) log pi
i(a|x(h))
µi(a|x(h))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Only depends on pii.
Thus if
N∑
i=1
Ωi(pi, pi∗) = 0 for the game defined with reward ri(h, a), then
N∑
i=1
Ωi(pi, pi∗) = 0 for the game defined on reward
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) the monotonicity is also
N∑
i=1
Ωi(pi, pi∗) = 0.
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)Ea∼(pi∗i,pi−it )(..|x(h))[r
i
pi∗i,pi−it
(h, a)− ripit(h, a)]
= −η
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi\Z
ρpi
∗i
(h)
∑
a∈A
pi∗i(a|x(h)) log pi
∗i(a|x(h))
pii(a|x(h))
The other cases are left in appendix.
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G. Reward Transformation in Zero-Sum Games
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− 1i=τ(h)η log pi(a|x(h)) + 1i 6=τ(h)η log pi(a|x(h)) (5)
or for any µ,
ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− 1i=τ(h)η log pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h)) + 1i 6=τ(h)η log
pi(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h)) (6)
And in that case:
d
dt
J(y) =
N∑
i=1
[V ipiit,pi∗−i
− V ipi∗ ]− η
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
∗i
(h)ρpit
−i
(h)KL(pi∗(.|x(h)), pit(.|x(h)))
Proof. The game is still zero-sum so the monotonicity is still zero.
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈H\Z
ρpi
−i
t (h)ρpi
∗i
(h)Ea∼(pi∗i,pi−it )(..|x(h))[r
i
pi∗i,pi−it
(h, a)− ripit(h, a)]
= −η
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi\Z
ρpi
∗i
(h)ρpi
−i
t (h)
∑
a∈A
pi∗i(a|x(h)) log pi
∗i(a|x(h))
pii(a|x(h))
As in that case ri
pi∗i,pi−it
(h, a)− ripit(h, a) = 0 for all h ∈ H−i.
Discuss biais convergence trade-off.
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H. Convergence to a Nash
The proof of the convergence to an exact Nash uses similar arguments used to prove convergence for strict Lyapunov functions
in the discrete vase. From lemma 6.1 we know that for a policy sequence starting from pi0 being the uniform policy and pik is
the solution of the game with the reward transformation ripi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))pik−1(a|x(h)) . In this section, we
will call this map F (and F (µ) = pi∗µ is the equilibrium of the game defined on r
i
pi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) ).
We will show that pik = F k(pi0) will converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game pi∗.
The proof proceeds in 3 steps:
• First we prove that F is continuous,
• Second we prove that minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, F (µ))−minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) < 0,
• The second step is enough to prove that minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, pik) converges to a value c. The last step proves by
contradiction that c can’t be anything but 0.
H.1. Continuity
The first step is to show that the map F (.) which associate µ to the Nash equilibrium over the game defined over
riµ,pi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) is continuous.
Then for all µ, µ′, we have riµ,pi(h, a)− riµ′,pi(h, a) = −η1i=τ(h)ρpi−i (h) log
µ′(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h))
Let us write now w∗µ and w
∗
µ′ the fixed point of the dynamic defined in lemma 4.1 and Ξµ and Ξµ′ their corresponding
Lyapunov function and pi∗µ and pi
∗
µ′ .
Let us consider that w˜ follow the following ODE (where Qiµ,pit(x, a) is the Q-function for reward r
i
µ,pi(h, a) = r
i(h, a)−
η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) )
˙˜wit(x, a) = ρ
pi−it (x)[Qiµ,pit(x, a)−Qiµ,pit(x, ax)]
piit(.|x) = arg max
p∈∆A
Λi(p, w˜it(x, .))
Let us suppose furthermore that we start from the equilibrium w˜(0) = w∗µ
Let us examine the variation of Ξµ′(w˜(t)) and write pit(.|x) = Γ(w˜(t)(., x)):
d
dt
Ξ(pi∗µ′ , pit) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗
µ′
i
(x)ρpi
−i
t (x)〈pit(.|x)− pi∗µ′(.|x), Qiµ,pit(x, .)〉
=
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗
µ′
i
(x)ρpi
−i
t (x)〈pit(.|x)− pi∗µ′(.|x), Qiµ′,pit(x, .)〉
+
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
∗
µ′
i
(x)ρpi
−i
t (x)〈pit(.|x)− pi∗µ′(.|x), Qiµ,pit(x, .)−Qiµ′,pit(x, .)〉
Let have µ, µ′ ∈ D0 (where D0 is an open set). Furthermore let us suppose that for all µ ∈ D0 there exists  > 0 such that
for all x ∈ X and a ∈ A µ(a|x) > .
The function log is locally Lipschitz of constant K in D0.
As pit = pi∗µ we can bound Q
i
µ,pit(x, .)−Qiµ′,pit(x, .) ≤ ηTmax
[
supµ′′∈D0 maxh∈Hi
1
ρ
pi
∗−i
µ′′ (h)
]
K‖µ− µ′‖
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Finally We can have that:
d
dt
Ξ(pi∗µ′ , pit) ≤ −ηΞ(pi∗µ′ , pit) + ηTmax
[
sup
µ′′∈D0
max
h∈Hi
1
ρ
pi∗−i
µ′′ (h)
]
K‖µ− µ′‖
This imply that Ξ(pi∗µ′ , pi
∗
µ) ≤ Tmax
[
supµ′′∈D0 maxh∈Hi
1
ρ
pi
∗−i
µ′′ (h)
]
K‖µ− µ′‖.
This finally imply that the map µ→ pi∗µ is continuous.
H.2. The function minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) is a strict Lyapunov function
We have seen that the following equality holds (in lemma 6.1):
Ξ(pi∗, pik)− Ξ(pi∗, pik−1) = −Ξ(pik, pik−1) + 1η
N∑
i=1
mik +
1
η
N∑
i=1
δik +
1
η
N∑
i=1
κik
Where:
Ξ(µ, pi) =
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Hi
ρµ
i
(h)KL(µ(.|x(h)), pi(.|x(h)))
Where:
κik =
∑
x∈X i
ρpi
∗i
(x)ρpi
−i
k (x)
∑
a∈A
[
pi∗i(a|x(h))− pik(a|x(h))
]
kQipik(x, a) ≤ 0
Where:
δik = V
i
piik,pi
∗−i(hinit)− V ipi∗(hinit) ≤ 0
And where:
mik = V
i
pik
(hinit)− V ipi∗i,pi−ik (hinit)− V
i
piik,pi
∗−i(hinit) + V
i
pi∗(hinit)
And where
N∑
i=1
mik ≤ 0 if the game is monotone.
First let us write Π∗ the set of Nash equilibrium if the game defined on reward ri(h, a).
The Goal of this section is to prove that that minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, F (µ))−minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) < 0 for all µ 6∈ Π∗
The first step of our proof is to show if there exists a k such that Ξ(F (µ), µ) = 0, then F (µ), µ ∈ Π∗.
To do so, we first need to prove a serie of technical lemma.
Lemma H.1. For all pi, pi∗ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have:
V ipi∗(hinit)− V ipii,pi∗−i(hinit) =
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
i
(x)ρpi
∗−i
(x)
∑
a
(pii(a|x)− pi∗i(a|x))Qipi∗(x, a)
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Proof. Let’s write p¯i = (pii, pi∗−i)
V ipi∗(hinit)− V ipii,pi∗−i(hinit)
=
∑
h∈H
ρpi
i
(h)ρpi
∗−i
(h)[V ipi∗(h)−
∑
a∈A
p¯i(a|x(h))V ipi∗(ha)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V i
pi∗ (hinit)
−
∑
h∈H
ρpi
i
(h)ρpi
∗−i
(h)
∑
a∈A
p¯i(a|x(h))ri(h, a)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V i
pii,pi∗−i (hinit)
=
∑
h∈H
ρpi
i
(h)ρpi
∗−i
(h)[V ipi∗(h)−
∑
a∈A
p¯i(a|x(h))[ri(h, a) + V ipi∗(ha)]]
=
∑
h∈H
ρpi
i
(h)ρpi
∗−i
(h)
∑
a∈A
(pi∗(a|x(h))− p¯i(a|x(h)))[Qipi∗(h, a)]
=
∑
h∈Hi
ρpi
i
(h)ρpi
∗−i
(h)
∑
a∈A
(pi∗i(a|x(h))− pii(a|x(h)))Qipi∗(h, a) as p¯i = pi∗ on all the opponent nodes.
=
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
i
(x)ρpi
∗−i
(x)
∑
a∈A
(pi∗i(a|x)− pii(a|x))[Qipi∗(x, a)]
Lemma H.2. Let pi∗ be a policy. If for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, x ∈ Xi and pˆi such that
∑
a (pi
∗(a|x)− pˆi(a|x))Qipi∗(x, a) ≥ 0
then pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let suppose that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, x ∈ Xi and pˆi we have
∑
a (pi
∗(a|x)− pˆi(a|x))Qipi∗(x, a) ≥ 0
Then by lemma H.1 we have:
∀i, V ipi∗(hinit)− V ipii,pi∗−i(hinit) =
∑
x∈Xi
ρpi
i
(x)ρpi
∗−i
(x)
∑
a
(pii(a|x)− pi∗i(a|x))Qipi∗(x, a) ≥ 0
Thus pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Corollary H.1. If pi∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, x ∈ Xi and pˆi such that∑
a (pi
∗(a|x)− pˆi(a|x))Qipi∗(x, a) < 0
Proof. This is a direct consequence of lemma H.2
Theorem H.1. If pi∗µ = F (µ) = µ, then µ is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined on ri(h, a).
Proof. First we will write V iµ,pi(h) (Q
i
µ,pi(h, a)) to be the value function (Q-function) with respect to the reward r
i
µ,pi(h, a) =
ri(h, a)− η1i=τ(h)
ρpi−i (h)
log pi(a|x(h))µ(a|x(h)) .
The reader will notice that since pi∗µ = µ then Q
i
µ,pi∗µ
(h, a) = Qipi∗µ(h, a).
We will prove the result by contradiction. Let suppose that pi∗µ is not a Nash equilibrium for the game with reward r
i(h, a).
Then there exists i, pˆi and x˜ ∈ Xi such that
∑
a
(
pi∗µ(a|x˜)− pˆi(a|x˜)
)
Qipi∗µ(x˜, a) < 0
For the rest of this proof, we will write pˆiα the policy defined as pi∗µ on all x ∈ X\{x˜} and (1− α)pi∗µ + αpˆi on state x˜.
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As pi∗µ is a Nash equilibrium for the reward r
i
µ,pi(h, a), then V
i
µ,pi∗µ
(hinit)− V iµ,pˆiα(hinit) ≥ 0
V iµ,pi∗µ(hinit)− V iµ,pˆiα(hinit)
=
∑
h∈H
ρpˆiα(h)[V iµ,pi∗µ(h)−
∑
a∈A
pˆiα(a|x(h))V iµ,pi∗µ(ha)]−
∑
h∈H
ρpˆiα(h)
∑
a∈A
pˆiα(a|x(h))riµ,pˆiα(h, a)]
=
∑
h∈x˜
ρpˆiα(h)[V iµ,pi∗µ(h)−
∑
a∈A
pˆiα(a|x(h))[riµ,pˆiα(h, a) + V iµ,pi∗µ(ha)]] as pˆiα and pi∗µ are only different on x˜
=
∑
h∈x˜
ρpi
∗
µ(h)[V iµ,pi∗µ(h)−
∑
a∈A
pˆiα(a|x(h))[Qiµ,pi∗µ(h, a)−
η1i=τ(h)
ρpi
∗−i
µ (h)
log
pˆiα(a|x(h))
µ(a|x(h)) ]]
=
∑
h∈x˜
ρpi
∗
µ(h)[
η1i=τ(h)
ρpi
∗−i
µ (h)
KL(pˆiα(.|x(h)), µ(.|x(h))) +
∑
a∈A
[pi∗µ(a|x(h))− pˆiα(a|x(h))]Qiµ,pi∗µ(h, a)]
= η
(∑
h∈x˜
ρpi
∗i
µ (h)
)
KL(pˆiα(.|x˜), µ(.|x˜)) + ρpi∗µ(x˜)
∑
a∈A
[pi∗µ(a|x˜)− pˆiα(a|x˜)]Qiµ,pi∗µ(x˜, a)]
≤ η
(∑
h∈x˜
ρpi
∗i
µ (h)
)
1
2
‖pˆiα(.|x˜)− µ(.|x˜)‖21 + ρpi
∗
µ(x˜)
∑
a∈A
[pi∗µ(a|x˜)− pˆiα(a|x˜)]Qiµ,pi∗µ(x˜, a)] by the Pinsker inequality.
≤ ηα2
(∑
h∈x˜
ρpi
∗i
µ (h)
)
1
2
‖pˆi(.|x˜)− µ(.|x˜)‖21 + αρpi
∗
µ(x˜)
∑
a∈A
[pi∗µ(a|x˜)− pˆi(a|x˜)]Qiµ,pi∗µ(x˜, a)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 asQiµ,pi∗µ (x˜, a) = Q
i
pi∗µ (x˜, a)
So there exists c > 0 and d < 0 such that V iµ,pi∗µ(hinit)− V iµ,pˆiα(hinit) ≤ cα2 + dα = cα(α + dc ). And finally there exists
α > 0 such that V iµ,pi∗µ(hinit) − V iµ,pˆiα(hinit) < 0 which contradicts the fact that pi∗µ is a Nash for the game on reward
riµ,pi(h, a).
From theorem H.1 we can conclude that for all µ 6∈ Π∗, we have Ξ(F (µ), µ) > 0 this directly imply that for all µ 6∈ Π∗ we
have minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, F (µ))−minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) < 0.
H.3. Convergence to the Nash
We want to show that the sequence of policies pik = F k(pi0) converges to a Nash equilibrium of the game. And we suppose
that all policies pi∗ are interior.
Under these conditions, we have the following properties:
• F (.) is a continuous map on the interior of the simplex (see section H.1),
• for all µ 6∈ Π∗ we have minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, F (µ))−minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) < 0.
• µ→ minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, F (µ)) is a positive function infinite on the border of the simplex continuous in µ.
• µ→ ∆V (µ) = minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, F (µ))−minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) is continuous in µ.
Let us write Ω¯c = {µ| minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) ≤ c} and Ωc = {µ| minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, µ) ≤ c}. For all finite c the set Ωc is
closed and bounded set (and Ω¯c is an open bounded set). Then Ωc is a compact set.
Let us consider that C = minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, pi0). Since ∆V (µ) < 0 then the sequence of minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, pik) converges to
c.
By contradiction let us suppose that c > 0. This means that all the pik are all in the closed set ΩC,c = Ω¯C\Ωc. The set ΩC,c
is bounded and thus is a compact. The image of ΩC,c through ∆V (.) (which is a continuous map) is a compact K and
kmax = supx∈K < 0. This means that ∀k,∆V (pik) ≤ kmax
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This means that
min
pi∗∈Π∗
Ξ(pi∗, pik) ≤ min
pi∗∈Π∗
Ξ(pi∗, pi0) +
k−1∑
i=0
∆V (pii)
≤ C + k × kmax
This contradicts the fact that c > 0 as there exists k such that C + k × kmax < c.
In the end k → minpi∗∈Π∗ Ξ(pi∗, pik) converges to 0 and pik converges to Π∗
Finding Equilibrium via Regularization
I. Monotone Games
In this section, we prove that zero-sum, zero-sum N -player polymatrix games and games where the profit of one player is
decoupled from the interaction with the opponent are monotone.
(i) zero-sum two-player games, i.e., V 1pi = −V 2pi , the monotonicity condition becomes:
Ωi(pi, µ) = V ipii,pi−i(hinit)− V iµi,pi−i(hinit)− V ipii,µ−i(hinit) + V iµi,µ−i(hinit)
It is easy to notice that Ω1(pi, µ) = −Ω2(pi, µ) as ∀pi, µ V 1µ1,pi2(hinit) = −V 2µ1,pi2(hinit)
(ii) in zero-sum N -player polymatrix games, i.e., when the value can be decomposed in a sum of pairwise interactions
V ipi =
∑
j 6=i
V˜ ipii,pij with V˜
i
pii,pij = −V˜ jpij ,pii
In that case: ∑
i∈{1,...,N}
Ωi(pi, µ) =
∑
i∈{1,...,N}
∑
j 6=i
[V˜ ipii,pij (hinit)− V ipii,µj (hinit)− V iµi,pij (hinit) + V iµi,µj (hinit)]∑
i∈{1,...,N}
∑
j<i
[V˜ ipii,pij (hinit)− V ipii,µj (hinit)− V iµi,pij (hinit) + V iµi,µj (hinit)]
+ [V˜ jpij ,pii(hinit)− V jpij ,µi(hinit)− V jµj ,pii(hinit) + V jµj ,µi(hinit)]
=
∑
i∈{1,...,N}
∑
j<i
0 = 0
(iii) in games where the profit of one player is decoupled from the interaction with the opponents, i.e., when the value can be
decomposed in V ipi = V¯
i
pii + V¯
i
pi−i .
In this case Ωi(pi, µ) = V ipii,pi−i(hinit) − V iµi,pi−i(hinit) − V ipii,µ−i(hinit) + V iµi,µ−i(hinit) = V¯ ipii + V¯ ipi−i − [V¯ iµi + V¯ ipi−i ] −
[V¯ ipii + V¯
i
µ−i ] + V¯
i
µi + V¯
i
µ−i = 0
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J. Empirical set up
batch size the batch size used to update the policy and the Q-function
batch size actor to fasten the experiment we use an actor critic setup with 512 actors all
of them produces batch of trajectories.
eta the parameter used to transform the reward
lambda Retrace the parameter of retrace
epsilon greedy the epsilon greedy policy parameter
Gradient clipping value all gradient on the policy and the value are clipped
max number of steps the maximum number of steps
reward re-centered every the recentering periode
policy learning rate start the policy learning rate starts its exponential decay at this value
policy learning rate end the exponential decay ends at this value
threshold NeuRD the NeuRD threshold
Neural net structure for pi and Q MLP with 2 hidden layer of 128 unit
Figure 4. This table summarize the meaning of all hyperparameters of the algorithm
J.1. Estimation of the Critique
The update on a Q-function is done such as to minimize the l2-norm between Qˆiw(xl, al) a retrace target (Espeholt et al.,
2018) constructed using the sequence or policies and rewards (written Qiretrace target).
wi ← wi + α
K∑
l=0
τ(xl)×
[
Qiretrace target(xl, al)− Qˆiw(xl, al)
]
∂wiQˆ
i
w(xl, al). (7)
J.2. Low Variance Unbiased Estimate of the Expected Payoff
This version of NeuRD uses an unbiased estimate and low-variance of the return (Schmid et al., 2019). We will account that
the policy piiθi(a
i|xl) we want to evaluate can be different from the one we are sampling νiθi(ai|xl) and the unbiased return
is computed as follow in the case of the reward transform for zero-sum games as follows:
Q¯iw(xl, a)
=

−η log(pi(a|xl)) + Qˆiw(xl, a) if a 6= al
−η log(pi(a|xl)) + Qˆiw(xl, a)
+ 1ν(ai|xl)
[
ri(xl, al) + Eb∼pi(.|xl+1)[Q¯
i
w(xl+1, b)]− Qˆiw(xl, a)
]
if a = al

if τ(xl) = i
Q¯iw(xl, a) =
{
η log(pi(a|xl)) if a 6= al
η log(pi(a|xl)) + 1ν(ai|xl)
[
ri(xl, al) + Eb∼pi(.|xl+1)[Q¯
i
w(xl+1, b)]
]
if a = al
}
if τ(xl) 6= i
By convention, we will have that ∀a, Q¯iw(xK+1, a) = 0
J.3. NeuRD update
In the second step we correct for the reach probability:
Q˜iw(xl, a) =
(
l−1∏
k=0
1τxl 6=ipi(ak|xl) + 1τxl=i
ν(ak|xl)
)
Q¯iw(xl, a)
Where pi and ν are the policies at the player’s turn.
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The policy update follows the following equation:
θi ← θi + α
K∑
l=0
1τxl=i
∑
ai
∂θiξ
i
θi(a
i|xl)
[
Q˜iw(xl, a
i)
]
. (8)
Where ξiθi is the logit of policy and softmax(ξ
i
θi
) = piiθi . The NeuRD update rule require an additional clipping parameter to
avoid numerical instabilities. We leave the reader to (Omidshafiei et al., 2019).
Last, we obtained the exploration policy ν by doing an epsilon greedy policy pi.
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K. Experiments
K.1. Tabular Experiments
In this section we present experiments on Kuhn poker and Leduc poker that illustrate the convergence property for the
dynamics on the transformed reward.
K.1.1. TABULAR EXPERIMENTS WITH A FIXED REGULARIZATION (REWARD TRANSFORMATION FOR ZERO-SUM
GAMES)
The two following figures illustrate the method described in section 5. The following experiment Shows the FoReL dynamics
on Kuhn poker :
Figure 5. Kuhn Poker.
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And the following experiment Shows the FoReL dynamics on Leduc poker :
Figure 6. Leduc Poker.
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K.1.2. TABULAR EXPERIMENTS WITH A FIXED REGULARIZATION (REWARD TRANSFORMATION FOR MONOTONE
GAMES)
The two following figures illustrate the method described in section 5. The following experiment Shows the FoReL dynamics
on Kuhn poker :
Figure 7. Kuhn Poker.
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And the following experiment Shows the FoReL dynamics on Leduc poker :
Figure 8. Leduc Poker.
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K.1.3. TABULAR EXPERIMENTS WITH AN ADDAPTIVE REGULARIZATION (REWARD TRANSFORMATION FOR
MONOTONE GAMES AND THE REWARD IS CHANGED EVERY 20000 STEPS)
The two following figures illustrate the method described in section 6. And the following experiment Shows the FoReL
dynamics on Kuhn poker :
Figure 9. Kuhn Poker.
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And the following experiment Shows the FoReL dynamics on Leduc poker :
Figure 10. Leduc Poker.
Finding Equilibrium via Regularization
K.2. Deep Reinforcement Learning Experiments with player only regularization
In this section, we run NeuRD on Leduc poker, Kuhn poker, Liars Dice and GoofSpiel with the reward transform for
monotone games. The reward is adapted every 75000 steps.
batch size 256
batch size actor 32
eta {1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.0}
lambda Retrace 1.0
epsilon greedy 0.1
Gradient clipping value 1000
max number of steps 4000000
reward re-centered every 75000
policy learning rate start 0.01
policy learning rate end 0.00001
threshold NeuRD 2
Neural net structure for pi and Q MLP with 2 hidden layer of 128 unit
Experiment on Liars Dice:
Figure 11. Liars Dice.
Experiment on Leduc Poker:
Figure 12. Leduc Poker.
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Experiment on Kuhn Poker:
Figure 13. Kuhn Poker.
Experiment on Goofspiel:
Figure 14. Goofspiel 4 cards.
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In these experiments, we run NeuRD on Leduc poker, Kuhn poker, Liars Dice and GoofSpiel with the reward transform for
monotone games with a constant regularization.
batch size 256
batch size actor 32
eta {1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.0}
lambda Retrace 1.0
epsilon greedy 0.1
Gradient clipping value 1000
max number of steps 4000000
reward re-centered every Never
policy learning rate start 0.01
policy learning rate end 0.00001
threshold NeuRD 2
Neural net structure for pi and Q MLP with 2 hidden layer of 128 unit
Experiment on Liars Dice:
Figure 15. Liars Dice.
Experiment on Leduc Poker:
Figure 16. Leduc Poker.
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Experiment on Kuhn Poker:
Figure 17. Kuhn Poker.
Experiment on Goofspiel:
Figure 18. Goofspiel 4 cards.
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In these experiments, we run NeuRD on Leduc poker, Kuhn poker, Liars Dice and GoofSpiel with the reward transform for
monotone games with an exponential decay regularization to the regularization on the label.
batch size 256
batch size actor 32
eta exponential decay starting from 1.0 until the target value {1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.0}
lambda Retrace 1.0
epsilon greedy 0.1
Gradient clipping value 1000
max number of steps 4000000
reward re-centered every Never
policy learning rate start 0.01
policy learning rate end 0.00001
threshold NeuRD 2
Neural net structure for pi and Q MLP with 2 hidden layer of 128 unit
Experiment on Liars Dice:
Figure 19. Liars Dice.
Experiment on Leduc Poker:
Figure 20. Leduc Poker.
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Experiment on Kuhn Poker:
Figure 21. Kuhn Poker.
Experiment on Goofspiel:
Figure 22. Goofspiel 4 cards.
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K.3. Deep Reinforcement Learning Experiments with two player regularization
In these experiments, we run NeuRD on Leduc poker, Kuhn poker, Liars Dice and GoofSpiel with the reward transform for
zero-sum games with an exponential decay regularization to the regularization on the label.
batch size 256
batch size actor 32
eta exponential decay starting from 1.0 until the target value {1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.0}
lambda Retrace 1.0
epsilon greedy 0.1
Gradient clipping value 1000
max number of steps 4000000
reward re-centered every Never
policy learning rate start 0.01
policy learning rate end 0.00001
threshold NeuRD 2
Neural net structure for pi and Q MLP with 2 hidden layer of 128 unit
Experiment on Liars Dice:
Figure 23. Liars Dice.
Experiment on Leduc Poker:
Figure 24. Leduc Poker.
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Experiment on Kuhn Poker:
Figure 25. Kuhn Poker.
Experiment on Goofspiel:
Figure 26. Goofspiel 4 cards.
Finding Equilibrium via Regularization
K.4. Deep Reinforcement Learning Experiments with two player regularization with a large batch
In these experiments, we run NeuRD on Leduc poker, Kuhn poker, Liars Dice and GoofSpiel with the reward transform for
zero-sum games with an exponential decay regularization to the regularization on the label.
batch size 2018
batch size actor 32
eta exponential decay starting from 1.0 until the target value {1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.0}
lambda Retrace 1.0
epsilon greedy 0.1
Gradient clipping value 1000
max number of steps 4000000
reward re-centered every Never
policy learning rate start 0.01
policy learning rate end 0.00001
threshold NeuRD 2
Neural net structure for pi and Q MLP with 2 hidden layer of 128 unit
Experiment on Liars Dice:
Figure 27. Liars Dice.
Experiment on Leduc Poker:
Figure 28. Leduc Poker.
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Experiment on Kuhn Poker:
Figure 29. Kuhn Poker.
Experiment on Goofspiel:
Figure 30. Goofspiel 4 cards.
